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THE ECONOMIC AND MONETARY
UNION: A STANDARDS OR RULESBASED INSTITUTION?
I. INTRODUCTION

E

urope’s introduction of the euro into the Economic and
Monetary Union (“EMU”) may represent the boldest economic achievement of the last century.1 The magnitude of this
venture, though economic in nature, also has vital significance
in Europe’s plan to become an ever-larger international political
leader.2 The euro zone consists of approximately two hundred
ninety million people — a population comparable to that of the
United States.3 The EMU also makes up more than 21% of the
world Gross Domestic Product (“GDP”).4 In 2000, the EMU was
responsible for 14.7% and 13% of the world’s exports and imports respectively.5 These statistics invite the assertion that the
European Union (“EU”) today shares several characteristics
with other influential societies of the past6 that have successfully introduced new currencies. The EMU may very well be on
a path for continued future success; however, despite the promising facts mentioned here, the EU still faces numerous challenges including, the task of continuously reevaluating the rules

1. Robert Mundell, Making the Euro Work, WALL ST. J., Apr. 30 1998,
available at 1998 WL-WSJ 3492150 (“Throughout history the world economy
has seen a succession of important currencies that have attained the status of
international currencies…[T]hese currencies have been associated with great
powers in their ascendancy. That was the case with the shekels, darics,
drachmas, denarii, dinars, ducats, deniers, thalers, livres, pounds and dollars.”).
2. THE EUROPEAN UNION: A GUIDE FOR AMERICANS ch. 3 (2002), at
http://www.eurunion.org/infores/euguide/euguide.pdf (last visited Jan. 15,
2003) [hereinafter GUIDE].
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Mundell, supra note 1. Common factors which contributed to the success of currencies in the past were: size of the transaction domain, a stable
monetary policy, the power of the central state and the fallback value of the
currency. Id. The author also lists the absence of arbitrary exchange restrictions as a factor, but discounts it as inapplicable in his discussion on the EU.
Id.
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which comprise the EMU. Even in the wake of the recent success of the euro, the EU may soon find that the very rules which
form the EMU could result in harsh economic and political conflicts within the EU or worse yet — the eventual undoing of the
EMU.7
This Note will consider the alternative implementation methods of the EMU policies by considering the Stability and Growth
Pact — one rule which has recently forced the EU to face several difficult questions about its chosen methods of legislation.
The discussion will focus on whether the EU should have taken
a standard or rules-based approach in the creation of the new
Stability and Growth Pact, as well as the future development
and implementation of the Pact and other EMU laws. Part II
will introduce the European Union and its governing bodies.
Part III will outline the legislation, background and present
status of the Stability and Growth Pact. Part IV will discuss
the arguments for and against having a regime that is either
standards or rules-based and go on to consider several theories
which have further explored the standards and rules debate.
Part V will attempt to classify the Pact as either a standard or a
rule and discuss the two alternatives of jurisprudence with regard to implementing the requirements of the Pact. This Note
will conclude by considering what lies in store for the EMU and
whether a rules or standards-based approach will be the more
suitable path to choose in future instances.
II. THE EUROPEAN UNION
The EU came into existence upon the implementation of the
Maastricht Treaty on European Union in 1993.8 It is a treatybased organization that directs economic and political cooperation among fifteen European nations, though the “fundamental”
goal was to create an increasingly stronger union among the
7. Werner Van Lembergen & Margaret G. Wachenfeld, Economic and
Monetary Union in Europe: Legal Implications of the Arrival of the Single
Currency, 22 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1, 31 (1998).
8. GUIDE, supra note 2, at ch. 1. However, the process of integration began in the 1950s by six countries — Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxemburg, and the Netherlands — as a post-war Western Europe took necessary
steps in rebuilding its economy. Id. The six nations also pursued integration
of both military and political resources. Id. Such efforts failed and unification, at the time, was continued on the economic front alone. Id.

File: PaulMacro.doc

2003]

Created on: 10/19/2003 8:42 PM

Last Printed: 11/22/2003 12:11 PM

ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION

411

nations of Europe.9 Through these efforts, the European Union
has brought economic prosperity to Western Europe and helped
bring stability to Central and Eastern Europe.10 In dealing with
the monumental task of uniting Europe, the EU has five governing bodies: (1) European Commission (“Commission”); (2)
Council of the European Union; (3) European Parliament; (4)
European Court of Justice; and (5) European Court of Auditors.11 Additionally, the EU also created the European Central
Bank (ECB) following the establishment of the EMU.12
The Commission drives EU policy13 by proposing legislation,
bearing administrative responsibilities, and ensuring that the
treaties are properly implemented.14 It also holds investigative
powers and can take legal action against persons, companies, or
Member States that violate EU rules.15 The Commission consists of commissioners who act in the EU’s interest independently of the national governments, which make up the EU.16
The Council of the European Union, the EU’s legislative body,
establishes EU laws based on proposals submitted by the Commission — the proposals and the subsequent laws must balance
national and EU interests.17 The Council of the European Union consists of ministers from each Member State.18 Different
ministers participate depending on the subject matter of a particular discussion.19 For example, the ministers of the Economic
and Finance (“ECOFIN”) Council discuss economic and finan9. Id.
10. Id.
11. GUIDE, supra note 2, at ch. 2. Furthermore, a European Council consisting of the heads of state and government of each Member State along with
the Commission president holds summits twice a year in order to provide
strategy and political direction for the EU as a whole. Id.
12. Id. at ch. 3; Lembergen & Wachenfeld, supra note 7, at 9.
13. GUIDE, supra note 2, at ch. 2.
14. Id.; EUROPA: THE EUROPEAN UNION ON LINE, at http://europa.eu.int/
eur-lex/en/about/pap/process_and_ players3.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2003)
[hereinafter EUROPA].
15. GUIDE, supra note 2, at ch. 2.
16. Id. In theory, the commissioners act in the interest of the EU alone,
despite the fact that the governments of the Member States nominate them.
Id.
17. Id.; EUROPA, supra note 14.
18. GUIDE, supra note 2, at ch. 2.
19. Id. See also EUROPA, supra note 14. The Council, the EU’s main decision-making body, is also referred to as the Council of Ministers. Id.
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cial affairs.20 The European Parliament can question both the
Commission and the Council and has veto power over legislation enacted by the Council.21 The Parliament is the EU’s public
forum as it is comprised of six hundred twenty-six members
elected in EU-wide elections for five-year terms.22 The European Court of Justice is the EU’s “Supreme Court.”23 Lastly, the
European Court of Auditors oversees the financial management
of the EU budget.24
Through these governing bodies, the EU initiated the process
of establishing the “single market” of the EMU in 1990.25
Though the introduction of the euro is the most noticeable result of the single market, it is actually the third (and final)
stage of the transition into the EMU.26 The first stage of the
process, which began on July 1, 1990, consisted of lifting restrictions on the movement of capital across national borders
within the EMU.27 The second stage, which started in January
1994, concerned setting up the European Monetary Institute in
Frankfurt, which set the stage for the ECB.28
The ECB now assists in the management of the euro by implementing monetary policy for the whole EMU.29 The ECB,
also based in Frankfurt, took over the fiscal duties of setting the
interest rates in Europe from the national central banks of the
Member States on June 1, 1998.30 The ECB, together with the
20. GUIDE, supra note 2, at ch. 2.
21. Id.; EUROPA, supra note 14.
22. GUIDE, supra note 2, at ch. 2. The number of seats is to increase to
seven hundred thirty-two due to the Treaty of Nice to take effect in 2005. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at ch. 3.
26. GUIDE, supra note 2, at ch. 3 (“[T]he euro represents the consolidation
of the European economic integration … [T]he euro is a palpable reality and
contributes to a broader sense of European identity.”).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Lembergen & Wachenfeld, supra note 7, at 9; see also Mundell, supra
note 1 (“A single currency implies a single policy.”); GUIDE, supra note 2, at ch.
3, 7.
30. Dagmar Aalund, Investing in Euroland: What’s the Euro? And Other
Common Asked Questions About the Planned Single Currency, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 28, 1998, available at 1998 WL-WSJ 18985895; see also Daniel Yergin &
Joseph Stanislaw, Now Comes the Hard Part: The New Europe Poses Enormous Challenges for the Welfare State, for Protected Companies and for Politi-
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national central banks of the Member States acting as agents to
the ECB, will make up the European System of Central Banks
(ESCB).31 The function of the ECB is vital to the stability of the
EMU and the performance of the euro since, “no currency has
ever survived as an important international currency with a
sustained high rate of inflation.”32 Thus, the ECB’s sole responsibility is to keep prices stable.33
However, the responsibility for the future of the euro does not
totally fall upon the shoulders of the ECB. In order to ensure
economic stability within the EU the Member States must also
uphold certain fiscal standards. The nations must continue to
practice economic discipline, or conflicts stemming from the
stark economic differences among the many Member States will
arise.34 The European Union encourages this level of discipline
through two mechanisms. First, the EU will refuse liability for
the financial obligations of Member States, and, second, the
Member States have agreed to the restrictions of the Stability
and Growth Pact. 35
III. THE STABILITY AND GROWTH PACT
A. The “Pact”
The EU developed the Stability and Growth Pact in order to
foster consistent economic policies and to ensure budget discipline throughout the EMU36 by requiring each Member State to

cal Leaders, WALL ST. J., Sept. 28, 1998, available at 1998 WL-WSJ 18985958.
The president of the Bundesbank’s Central Bank Council will sit on the governing board of the European Central Bank, as will the presidents of the national banks of the twelve Member States. Id.
31. Lembergen & Wachenfeld, supra note 7, at 9.
32. Mundell, supra note 1.
33. Aalund, supra note 30; see also Mundell, supra note 1 (“The ECB will
have the same problems of monetary management as the Federal Reserve
System in the U.S.”). But see Aalund, supra note 30 (“The ECB isn’t a duplicate of the U.S.’s Fed. One of the most important differences between the two
is their mandates. Unlike the newly formed ECB, the Fed’s goal is to balance
the objectives of price stability with those of employment and economic
growth.”); see also Lembergen & Wachenfeld, supra note 7, at 9.
34. Lembergen & Wachenfeld, supra note 7, at 31.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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keep its budget deficit at a minimal level.37 The Stability and
Growth Pact consists of one Resolution and two Regulations
from the European Council.38 The main component of the Pact,
Council Resolution 97/C236/01 on the Stability and Growth
Pact, requires that Member States keep their “medium term
budgetary position close to balance or in surplus.”39 More specifically, each Member State must keep fiscal deficits below 3%
of GDP.40 Failure to abide by this standard will trigger sanctions imposed by the EU.41 At first glance, it may seem that the
Pact forces Member States to take action to correct their budgetary positions in case of an excessive deficit. However, the EU
ultimately intended the Stability and Growth Pact to serve as a
deterrent to induce Member States to avoid an excessive deficit
in the first place.42
Council Regulation 1466/97 of July 7, 1997 addresses the
“‘strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and
the surveillance and coordination of economic policies’”43 of
Member States as contained in Article 103 of the EC Treaty.44
The regulation improves the surveillance of the Member States’
economic and monetary positions by ensuring the flow of information from Member States to the Commission and Council.45
Essentially, the regulation outlines the rules concerning the
content, submission, examination, and monitoring of each

37. Council Resolution 97/C236/01 on the Stability and Growth Pact, 1997
O.J. (C236) 1.
38. RENEE SMITS, THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 86 (1997).
39. Tina Winther Frandsen, The Stability and Growth Pact — Status in
2001, DANMARKS NATIONALBANKEN, (2001), at http://www.nationalbanken.dk/
nb%5Cnb.nsf/alldocs/Smonetary_review_3quarter_01/$File/nb04.htm.
40. The Case for Co-operating — Economic Focus, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 24,
2002, available at 2002 WL 7247195 [hereinafter The Case for Co-operating].
41. Jan Meyers & Damien Levie, The Introduction of the Euro: Overview of
the Legal Framework and Selected Legal Issues, 4 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 321, *8
(1998).
42. Roger J. Goebel, European Economic and Monetary Union: Will the
EMU Ever Fly, 4 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 249, *39 (1998).
43. Lembergen & Wachenfeld, supra note 7, at 31–32; Meyers & Levie,
supra note 41, at *8; Goebel, supra note 42, at *38.
44. Lembergen & Wachenfeld, supra note 7, at 32; SMITS, supra note 38, at
87.
45. Goebel, supra note 38, at *42.
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Member States’ “stability program.”46 The regulation requires
that each Member State’s stability program contain: “(1) medium–term targets for its public finances (which should include
a budgetary position ‘close to balance or in surplus’); (2) the underlying economic assumptions and the sensitivity of the projected budgetary and debt positions to changes in such assumptions; and (3) budgetary and other economic policy measures for
achieving those targets.”47 The ECOFIN Council will review
each Member State’s stability program,48 thereby providing the
EU with an opportunity for early detection of significant deviations from medium–term targets.49 Such deviations could lead
to excessive budget deficits for Member States which, in turn,
could eventually upset continued price stability within the
EMU.50 The regulation provides the ECOFIN Council with the
opportunity to issue early warnings when it detects any such
divergences.51
The second regulation, Council Regulation 1467/97 of July 7,
1997, concerns “speeding up and clarifying the implementation
of the excessive deficit procedure”52 as contained in Article 104C
of the EC Treaty.53 The regulation provides a clear method for
proposing and implementing prompt corrective actions within a
year of the reporting of the excessive deficit.54 Upon reviewing
the economic position of a Member State, the European Com46. Lembergen & Wachenfeld, supra note 7, at 32. Member States not
participating in the EMU must submit “convergence programs” which are
similar to stability programs and subject to similar review by the EU. Id.
47. Meyers & Levie, supra note 41, at *8 (citing Council Regulation
1466/97 of 7 July 1997 Strengthening of the Surveillance of Budgetary Positions and the Surveillance and Coordination of Economic Policies, 1997 O.J.
(L209) 1); SMITS, supra note 38, at 87.
48. Goebel, supra note 42, at *38; SMITS, supra note 38, at 87.
49. Meyers & Levie, supra note 41, at *8; see SMITS, supra note 38, at 87
(“[The council] can either endorse [the program] or make a recommendation
that the program should be strengthened.”).
50. Lembergen & Wachenfeld, supra note 7, at 32.
51. Meyers & Levie, supra note 41, at *8.
52. Id. (citing Council Regulation 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 Speeding Up and
Clarifying the Implementation of Excessive Deficit Procedure, 1997 O.J.
(L209) 6); SMITS, supra note 38, at 88.
53. Lembergen & Wachenfeld, supra note 7, at 32; SMITS, supra note 38, at
88.
54. Lembergen & Wachenfeld, supra note 7, at 32; Goebel supra note 42, at
*39; Meyers & Levie, supra note 41, at *8; SMITS, supra note 38, at 88.
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mission will report to the Council of Ministers if an excessive
budget deficit exists.55 The Council of Ministers will then make
prompt recommendations for corrective measures to the Member State56 with deadlines for implementing these proposals.57 If
the Member State fails to take timely and adequate corrective
action, the Council may impose sanctions.58 Sanctions would
require that the Member State make an initial non-interest
bearing deposit of .2 to .5% of GDP and a variable component of
10% of the excess deficit.59 Until the Member State adequately
corrects its budgetary position, it must make yearly deposits
equal to 10% of the excess deficit over the 3% reference value
from the preceding year.60 The deposits shall, as a rule, be forfeited and converted into a non-recoverable fine, if the Council
decides that the excess deficit has not been corrected within two
years.61 The Council, however, may excuse an excessive deficit,
if one occurs as a result of a “severe economic downturn.”62

55. Lembergen & Wachenfeld, supra note 7, at 32.
56. Goebel, supra note 42, at *39.
57. Lembergen & Wachenfeld, supra note 7, at 32; see also Catch 2002 —
Strains on the EU’s Stability Pact, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 21, 2002, available
at 2002 WL 7247543 [hereinafter Catch 2002]; SMITS, supra note 38, at 88
(“Within four months of its decision that an excessive deficit exists, the Council would decide whether effective action had been taken to remedy the situation … The period of time between the reporting date and the decision to impose sanctions is not to exceed ten months.”).
58. Lembergen & Wachenfeld, supra note 7, at 32; Goebel, supra note 42,
at *39.
59. Meyers & Levie, supra note 41, at *8; see also Catch 2002, supra note
57; SMITS, supra note 38, at 89.
60. Meyers & Levie, supra note 41, at *8; SMITS, supra note 38, at 89 n.304.
61. Goebel, supra note 42, at *39; Meyers & Levie, supra note 41, at *8; see
also Catch 2002, supra note 57; SMITS, supra note 38, at 89 n.304.
62. Meyers & Levie, supra note 41, at *8. A severe economic downturn is
defined as a Member State experiencing an “‘annual fall of real GDP of at
least 2%,’” or if the Member State provides evidence that an annual reduction
in GDP of less than 2% is “nonetheless sufficiently exceptional in character.”
Goebel, supra note 42, at *8. It has been agreed that Member States should
not invoke this last clause unless sufficiently severe cases occur during a drop
of real GDP of .75% or more. Meyers & Levie, supra note 41, at *8.
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B. The History of the Pact
The German Minister of Finance initially proposed the Stability and Growth Pact in 1995.63 During the preparations of the
European Commission and the European Monetary Institute,
which took place between 1995 and 1997, in anticipation of the
EMU, German representatives fought for strict standards requiring Member States to maintain budget discipline upon joining the monetary union and to keep their respective deficits
low.64
The Germans believed that monetary stability could not be
achieved without rigid spending discipline.65 Germany feared
that weak budgetary rules,66 combined with the historic liberal
fiscal policies of several of their fellow Member States, would
severely impact the value of the euro.67 Germany reasoned that
weak budgetary rules would tempt Member States to borrow
and spend at the expense of the other Member States thereby
increasing interest rates, sparking inflation and undermining
the new EMU currency.68 Moreover, default by a Member State
63. Goebel, supra note 42, at *63 n.265; see also SMITS, supra note 38, at
84.
64. Goebel, supra note 42, at *38.
65. Matthias Herdegen, Global Economy, Lean Budgets, and Public Needs,
53 SMU L. REV. 543, 550 (2000) (“This discipline is the most important component of solidarity within the ‘compound’ or the European Union.”); see also
A Survey of EMU: Maastricht Follies, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 11 1998, available
at 1998 WL 8884807 [hereinafter Maastricht Follies] (“Excessive public borrowing always weakens a currency.”).
66. SMITS, supra note 38, at 84; James Graff, Loosening the Ties That Bind:
Europe’s Big Economies Can’t Keep Their Deficits Down, So Brussels is Changing the Rules, TIME INT’L, Oct. 7, 2002, at 56.
67. Could the Euro’s Nuclear Option Ever be Used? — How Credible are the
Rules for the Euro?, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 2, 2002, available at 2002 WL
7245002 [hereinafter Rules for the Euro]; see also Catch 2002, supra note 57
(“The idea of the pact is to prevent governments running loose fiscal policies
at the expense of other euro-area countries.”); Christopher Rhoads et al.,
Germany: Economic Has-Been? — Once Europe’s Growth Center, Nation Finds
Stagnation in Norm, WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 2002, available at 2002 WL-WSJ
3406672.
68. Maastricht Follies, supra note 65; see also Gambling on the Euro:
Europe’s Monetary Union is Neither Bound to Succeed Nor Doomed to Fail.
Leadership, Circumstances and Luck Will Combine to Decide Its Fate, THE
ECONOMIST, Jan. 2, 1999, available at 1999 WL 7361239 [hereinafter Gambling on the Euro] (“The concern was that chronic overborrowers would become even more fiscally irresponsible once they had adopted the euro, because
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could result in a political catastrophe for the EMU in terms of
the credibility of the euro.69 Members would have the luxury of
setting fiscal policy with the mindset of “when the chips are
down the union will act as lender of last resort,” which would
further reduce the need for fiscal adjustment.70 The Germans
felt that this “free rider” problem brought with it the probability
of both a reduction of currency and default in the monetary union making additional centralized control essential.71
Of course, not everyone felt the same way. For example,
many other Member States pushed for a more liberal resolution
to the issue of inflation and stability within the EMU.72 Representatives of several Member States were fearful that since
they would no longer have independent monetary or exchange–
rate policies leaving their countries with only fiscal policy as
one of a few ways to counter a recession.73 The Pact interferes
with a Member State’s automatic stabilizers.74 Due to the rethey would no longer face the financial-market sanction of higher interest
rates and (in the end) a depreciating currency.”); Trust or Mistrust Thy Euro
Neighbour?, THE ECONOMIST, July 21, 2001, available at 2001 WL 7319878
[hereinafter Trust or Mistrust].
69. Mundell, supra note 1.
70. Id.; see also Trust or Mistrust, supra note 68. One additional consideration was the possibility of a trend starting and three or four countries running a lax fiscal policy as opposed to one or two obviously aggregating the
problem. Id.
71. Mundell, supra note 1 (“…hence, the Stability and Growth Pact”); see
also Gambling on the Euro, supra note 68 (“Moreover this overborrowing
would henceforth be at least partly at the expense of Germany and the other
euro countries, because they would bear some of the cost of default, if it came
to that.”).
72. Goebel, supra note 42, at *38. France was the strongest proponent for
a more liberal “Pact.” Id. See also Jennie James, We’re Off to See the Wizard:
Critics Say the European Central Bank Should Use Its Powers to Lift Europe
Out of Its Slump. The Bank Says That’s Not Its Job. Who’s Behind the Curtain, Anyway?, TIME INT’L, Oct. 7, 2002, at 58 (“The U.S. Federal Reserve
doesn’t have an inflation target, which gives it leeway in pursuing its dual
mandate of price stability and maximum employment.”). The Fed’s reported
unofficial goal of inflation is below 3%, while the ECB’s is 2% — inherited
from Germany’s Bundesbank. Id.
73. Maastricht Follies, supra note 65; see also Gambling on the Euro, supra
note 68 (“In the meantime it rules out counter-cyclical fiscal policy or the sort
that will often be necessary, and for which there is no longer any plausible
national substitute.”).
74. Maastricht Follies, supra note 65. See Re-engineering the Euro, THE
ECONOMIST, Oct. 19, 2002, available at 2002 WL 7247884. Built-in or “auto-
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quirement that their deficits do not exceed 3% of GDP, as tax
revenues decline and deficits naturally increase during a recession, the Pact forces the governments of Member States to
tighten spending when government spending is most needed.75
Members also saw the need for a less strict agreement for
reasons somewhat removed from the Pact itself. Since the
Maastricht treaty provides that the ECB cannot bail out Member States, the market would attach a risk premium to lending
to a heavily indebted government.76 Third parties would hesitate before lending to those governments with high debt creating a market effect that would most likely serve as an incentive
to national governments to keep their debts lower in order to
remain competitive with their neighbors for foreign investments.77 Additionally, these members pointed out that the theory behind the EMU was that the “balance-of-payments among
its members will be automatic” as it is between regions within a
single country.78 A government whose country has an excessive
budgetary deficit will begin to spend less money in order to reduce its deficit.79 While these events take place in one country,
a government whose country is in a period of recession will
spend more money, invariably raising its deficit and thereby
creating a balancing effect.80 The situation, many European
nations feel, reduces the need for further centralized control.81
The debate on the Pact resulted in a compromise. As outlined
above, the compromise called for extensive surveillance on the
fiscal conditions of Member States in order to foresee serious
budgetary problems and a range of possible sanctions to be im-

matic” fiscal stabilizers include the automatic decline in taxes and increases
in welfare benefits during a recession. Id.
75. Re-engineering the Euro, supra note 74.
76. Gambling on the Euro, supra note 68; Europe’s Adventure Begins, THE
ECONOMIST, Jan. 2, 1999, available at 1999 WL 7361264.
77. Gambling on the Euro, supra note 68; see also Mundell, supra note 1
(“A monetary union removes a major source of macroeconomic instability by
barring central bank financing of fiscal deficits. [As] governments will no
longer be able to run up large public debts and force the central bank to inflate their burden away, it [is a move toward] fiscal prudence.”).
78. Mundell, supra note 1.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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plemented should budgetary deficits exceed prescribed limits.82
Though the Pact is strict, Members now have the opportunity to
implement corrective measures thereby preempting the need for
such sanctions.83 The Pact also shelters the EU from shortterm internal political pressures and fortifies the independence
of the ECB.84 However, the real tests on the viability of the Pact
and the strength of the EMU prompted by social and economic
expectations of the participating governments and their people
seem to be at the EU’s doorstep.85
C. The European Union Under the Pact
The novelty of the Pact understandably spurred uncertainty
as to how strictly the European Commission would construe the
rules embodying the Pact. Also uncertain was whether or not
the Commission would require any Member State to pay a fine,
should it fail to meet its obligations under the pact. These uncertainties gave rise to speculation that countries could allow
their budget deficits to exceed 3%, if they agreed to compensate
for the lapse during a later (more prosperous) economic period.86
However, in the latter part of 2001, in the midst of a global economic slowdown, the Commission issued a pronouncement
which quelled much of the speculation of the Member States, as
it provided insight into how strictly the Commission would construe the provisions of the Pact.87 The Commission warned the
eleven countries, then part of the euro zone, not to allow their
budget deficits to exceed 3%.88 The director general of the
Commission’s Economic and Financial Affairs directorate, at
the time, further stated that the Commission would take a hard
stance against Member States that did not abide by the budgetary restrictions of the Pact.89
True to the statements of the Commission and the director
general of the Economic and Financial Affairs directorate, in
82. Goebel, supra note 42, at *38.
83. Id.
84. Herdegen, supra note 65, at 554.
85. Id.
86. David I. Oyama, EU Warns Countries Not to Exceed Limits on Budget
Deficits, WALL ST. J., Nov. 29, 2001, available at 2001 WL-WSJ 29679248.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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January 2002, in the midst of much concern over the future
credibility of the euro,90 the European Commission issued a report in which both Germany and Portugal received admonishments for their growing deficits. The deficits at the time were
2.7% and 2.2% GDP respectively.91 The commissioner responsible for monetary and economic affairs reported that several
Member States had not met their targets as outlined in their
budgetary plans required by the Stability and Growth Pact.92
The Commission asked for more control by Member States over
government spending and pointed to Germany and Portugal
because their deficits were dangerously approaching the 3%
GDP limit.93 The European Union finance ministers issued
formal warnings to the two nations upon the recommendation of
the European Commission.94
On February 12, 2002, the European Union’s finance ministers declined to issue a further formal warning against Germany in exchange for the government’s commitments to take
unspecified “‘discretionary measures’” in order to bring its
budget “close to balance” by 2004.95 The compromise accomplished two goals by allowing Germany’s chancellor to preserve
his integrity while also protecting the financial discipline of the
euro zone.96 Although the European Central Bank Chief, Wim
Duisenberg said, “the compromise worked in the end,” the decision may have represented a setback for the European Commission in terms of its authority under the Pact.97 The Pact pro90. Brandon Mitchener, EU Commission Warns Countries on Big Deficits,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 2002, available at 2002 WL-WSJ 3384521. At the time,
the euro had fallen about 15% against the dollar since its inception in 1999.
Id.
91. Michael R. Sesit, In the Euro Zone, Sectors Now Have More Effect Than
Borders, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 2002, available at 2002 WL-WSJ 3384681.
92. Mitchener, supra note 89.
93. Id.
94. Sesit, supra note 91. The Commission did not want global confidence
in the euro to weaken (initially Germany’s fear) with the perception that
slower economic times would invariably intensify government spending.
Mitchener, supra note 90.
95. Paul Hofheinz & Christopher Rhoads, EU and Germany Reach Deal on
Deficit, WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 2002, available at 2002 WL-WSJ 3385880. The
“discretionary measures” would possibly include cuts in spending or higher
taxes. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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vides that the Commission may recommend that the Council of
the European Union issue warnings to Member States when
their budget deficits approach 3% GDP — only in this instance,
Furthermore, the
the recommendation went unheeded.98
Bundesbank Vice President Juergen Stark said the European
Union’s decision against issuing a warning to Germany may
have hurt Europe’s “budget credibility” — an opinion to which
Bank of America’s then current chief economist for Europe
agreed.99
Later in the year, another Member State’s financial activity
drew similar concerns from the rest of the EU. The French government, in hopes of inciting an economic growth spurt, cut income taxes by 5%.100 The concern was that the move would further hinder France from keeping its budget deficit below the 3%
ceiling, since their deficit had been growing at a rapid rate and
was projected to reach 3.2%.101 The French managed a small
diversion from the negative attention by stating that they could
still keep their deficits below the 3% limit of the Pact through
surpluses in local authority finances and other areas.102
By August 2002, Germany’s deficit was at 2.8%103 and by September Germany announced that its budget was 3.5%104 in the
first half of the year and was ever closer to breaching the limits
of the Pact. Similarly, Portugal admitted to a budgetary deficit
of over 4%, and concern for France and Italy’s budget deficits

98. Id.
99. Paul Hofheinz & Christopher Rhoads, EU Cuts Estimate of Annual
Growth to a Paltry 0.9%: Recovery is Not Expected to Begin Until Early 2003;
U.S. Exports Could Be Hit, WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 2002, available at 2002 WLWSJ 3405460; see also Rules for the Euro, supra note 67. If the EU governments’ finance ministers reject the Commission’s recommendation that Germany should be formally warned, “the whole stability pact would begin to
unravel.” Id.
100. David I. Oyama, French Budget Relies on Growth, Includes Tax Cut,
WALL ST. J., July 11, 2002, available at 2002 WL-WSJ 3400314.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. The Case for Co-operating, supra note 40.
104. Hofheinz & Rhoads, supra note 99. Germany’s budget was 3.7% in the
second half of 2001 which means the country’s deficit was, in fact, over the
limit for a twelve-month period. Id. However, a reprimand and fines occur
only when the 3% limit is violated for a full fiscal year. Id.
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grew as well.105 By the end of September, the four countries, —
which include the three largest economies in Europe — were off
their budgetary targets.106 Although the European Commission
acknowledged that the region’s economic downturn played a
role in the countries’ budgetary woes, the Commission also
blamed the countries’ “lack of fiscal prudence” during better
economic times.107 Sirkka Hamalainen, a member of the ECB’s
executive board, asserted that “governments didn’t realize or
didn’t accept fully, that during the good times it’s very important to build buffers.”108
Despite the ongoing finger pointing, in light of the probability
that an economic recovery would not begin at least until the
following year,109 and due to the state of the budgets of these
four countries, the European Commission agreed to extend the
deadline of having budgets “close to balance” by 2004 to 2006.110
Still, adding to the surprise of many doubters (including several
economists) Wim Duisenberg insisted that current interest
105. The Case for Co-operating, supra note 40. Concern for France’s budget
grows despite the French Prime Minister’s assurance that his country’s
budget deficit would not exceed the 3% limit. Hofheinz & Rhoads, supra note
99. Italy, the third largest economy in the EMU, had also been causing concern throughout the year due to its large deficits. Germany Breaks With Debt
Policy: A Wall Street Journal News Roundup, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 2002,
available at 2002 WL-WSJ 3408813.
106. Room for Improvement — Europe’s Economies — Is the Spate of Elections in Europe this Year Going to Alter the Region’s Economic Prospects?, THE
ECONOMIST, Mar. 16, 2002, available at 2002 WL 7245476.
107. David I. Oyama, EU Commission to Extend Target On Budget Deficits,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 25, 2002, available at 2002 WL-WS 3406974 [hereinafter
Oyama, Commission to Extend Target]. Germany, France and Italy are also
blamed for continuing protectionist practices for domestic industries thereby
applying “yesterday’s remedies to current problems.” Re-engineering the
Euro, supra note 74. Some say these giants should note their smaller brothers who have enjoyed faster economic growth while still successfully abiding
by the Pact’s budgetary requirements — all while practicing policies of liberalization, opened economies, reformed labor markets and welcomed competition. Id.
108. James, supra note 72.
109. Hofheinz & Rhoads, supra note 99. The European Commission also cut
its forecast for euro-area economic growth for the year by half a percentage
point to 0.9%. Id.
110. James, supra note 72; Oyama, Commission to Extend Target, supra
note 107; Catch 2002, supra note 57. Governments of the European Union are
supposed to have their budgets in balance by 2004 as a condition under the
Stability and Growth Pact. Id.
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rates (established by the ECB) would promote price stability
over time.111 It seemed the Pact that aimed to protect the large
economies from the small economies is now protecting the
smaller countries from the larger countries with past records of
stability.112 The events lend evidence to the claim that the Pact
had indeed gone “awry.”113
Clearly the Pact needs reform.114 Though Germany had initially feared the effects of excessive inflation on the euro, recession now plagues the EMU.115 It seems that the Pact, written to
combat inflation, has worsened the economic slowdowns in
Germany, Portugal, France and Italy.116 Interest rates were
higher than if monetary policy had been set by each country on
its own, and, as a result, the economies were squeezed.117 The
Pact forces governments to tighten fiscal policy at precisely the
time when spending is needed the most.118 For these reasons,
the voices of skeptics of the Pact could again be heard chiding
the strict budgetary requirements.119 A UBS Warburg economist in London has referred to the Pact as a “busted flush.”120
The European Commission’s very own president has been
quoted as calling the Pact “stupid,” and some economists have
111. James, supra note 72.
112. Graff, supra note 66. Representatives from smaller countries have
gone as far as to claim that the Pact has created a “two-class” system with the
larger states not having to abide by the same budgetary restrictions as the
smaller states. Id. The fact that Portugal has undergone formal sanctioning
does nothing to quell the vehement nature which exists throughout several
other members in the EMU since Portugal is understandably considered one
of the “smaller” guys. Id.
113. Id.
114. Re-engineering the Euro, supra note 74.
115. Double-dip in Germany? — Europe’s Slowing Economies, THE
ECONOMIST, Aug. 24, 2002, available at 2002 WL 7247193.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Re-engineering the Euro, supra note 74; Hofheinz & Rhoads, supra note
99. At the time, economists proposed allowing budget deficits to exceed the
3% limit and instead to focus on the “structural deficit” which is “based on
spending policies unaffected by economic changes.” Id. Others suggest removing budgetary restrictions and replacing them with “a commitment to
keep official borrowing within agreed limits.” Id. Many economists had gone
as far as to suggest that Europe would be better off without the pact and the
sooner it is gone the better. Rules for the Euro, supra note 67.
120. Graff, supra note 66.

File: PaulMacro.doc

2003]

Created on: 10/19/2003 8:42 PM

Last Printed: 11/22/2003 12:11 PM

ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION

425

supported the view that “rules that force countries to cut spending, even as their economies slow, are indeed stupid, if not positively dangerous.”121 The German author of the Pact, however,
still touts the agreement as a good thing for the EMU.122
Though the question whether the Pact has actually been harmful or helpful to the EMU thus far still lingers, the far more important question is how much and what type of reform is
needed to provide the EMU with a better tool for the future.
IV. STANDARDS VS. RULES
The existence of rules and standards within a legal system
and the distinctions in the methods of jurisprudence that each
provide has been the subject of debate by legal theorists for several decades.123 The obvious difference in the employment of
either rules or standards by a rule-making body is that rules

121. Reforming the EU’s Stability Pact?, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 26, 2002,
available at 2002 WL 7247925.
122. Graff, supra note 66. Germany’s Finance Minister, Theo Waigel —
often considered the godfather of the Stability Pact — who pushed for an
agreement explicitly outlining deficit limits, retorts, “only because of [the
Pact] has a culture of stability emerged in Europe.” Id. He believes that the
Pact has forced European governments to pay strict attention to keeping their
budgets balanced and without it the EMU would be much worse off. Id.
123. Ronald Dworkin initially developed his “interpretive theory of law” in
The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14 (1967), as an alternative to the theory of legal positivism, a system of rules which H.L.A. Hart set forth in THE
CONCEPT OF LAW (1961). Though Hart’s positivism viewed law as consisting
of only rules and, if no rule is available for a particular situation, judicial discretion, Dworkin’s response provided that the law really had both rules and
more general principles (standards) at its disposal as dispute solving resources. Brian Bix asserts:
[W]hile there are reasons to conclude that Dworkin had overstated
the differences between his view of the law and that of H.L.A. Hart,
and also that he made out the line between rules and principles to be
clearer than it (sometimes) is in practice, what remains is the insight
that a purely rule-based approach to the nature of law or the nature
of judicial reasoning would be problematic.
BRIAN BIX, JURISPRUDENCE: THEORY AND CONTEXT 8, 82 (2d ed. 1999); see also
Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV.
L. REV. 1685 (1976). Although the CLS analysis between rules and standards
often questions the very existence of a distinction of the two forms, for purposes of this paper, the discussion assumes that a viable distinction does exist.
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are more specifically stated than standards.124 The difference in
specificity between rules and standards effects the degree by
which a decision-making body may employ its own discretion
during the decision process. In theory, a rule, which commonly
represents an underlying policy,125 should eliminate the need for
judicial discretion in the decision-making process. Conversely,
a standard allows the decision-making body to employ its own
discretion in formulating its decision in order to achieve the
underlying policies. The use of either standards or rules by a
legislative body can result in various legal outcomes depending
on the amount of discretion the decision-making body is at liberty to use.
Removing the use of discretion from the decision-making
equation eliminates the opportunity for politics or biases to
creep into the process. The absence of discretion also allows a
greater level of predictability within the legal system. However, the removal of discretion can tie the hands of a decisionmaking body, leading to a result that is often over- or underinclusive. Discretion can provide the judge with the latitude of
applying the particular facts of a situation, thereby following
the “spirit” of the standard and ensuring that justice is served.
This section will explore these and other pros and cons of the
varying levels of discretion which exist through the use of rules
versus standards.
A. Rules
A rule is an attempt by a rule-making body to restate an underlying policy in “concrete terms.”126 One accepted definition of
a rule is as follows:
124. See THEODORE M. BENDITT, LAW AS RULE AND PRINCIPLE: PROBLEMS OF
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 74 (1978). A common example of a rule is: “The maximum
speed limit is 55 miles an hour,” whereas a standard is: “No one shall be permitted to profit from his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong.”
Id. See also EVA H. HANKS ET AL., ELEMENTS OF LAW 486–88 (1994) (quoting
Dworkin, supra note 123). Another example of a standard is: “Drivers may
travel ‘no faster than is reasonable.” Russell B. Korobkin, Behavior Analysis
and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23 (2000).
125. Although the terms principles and policies represent two distinct ideas,
the difference is not pertinent to this paper; “policies” will be used to stand for
the underlying motivations behind the promulgation of rules.
126. LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES 103 (2001);
see also HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
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A legal directive is “rule”-like when it binds a decisionmaker
to respond in a determinate way to the presence of delimited
triggering facts. Rules aim to confine the decisionmaker to
facts, leaving irreducibly arbitrary and subjective value
choices to be worked out elsewhere. A rule captures the background principle or policy in a form that from then on operates
independently. A rule necessarily captures the background
principle or policy incompletely and so produces errors of overor under-inclusiveness. But the rule’s force as a rule is that
decisionmakers follow it, even when direct application of the
background principle or policy to the facts would produce a different result.127

The attractiveness provided by the use of rules stems from
their automatic nature,128 which allows for a high level of predictability. A common example of a rule is contained in New
York’s per se law addressing the socially undesirable behavior
of driving while intoxicated. In New York, a person is prohibited from driving when that person’s blood consists of .10% of
alcohol (or higher).129 As in the above stated definition, when a
situation arises which calls for a legal determination based on a
particular rule, a judge merely recognizes certain “triggering
facts” — in this case a Blood Alcohol Content (BAC) of .10% —
and applies the appropriate rule for that particular situation in
order to find the desired outcome. In theory, there is no inser-

PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW, 139 (1994) (“The most
precise form of authoritative general direction may conveniently be called a
rule, although this term is often used much more broadly to signify a legal
proposition of any kind.”). For purposes of this paper, the term “rule” will be
used to connote a specific legal directive as opposed to a more “general” standard.
127. HANKS ET AL., supra note 124, at 45; see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, The
Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 58 (1992).
128. HART, JR. & SACKS, supra note 126, at 139 (“In the narrow and technical sense in which the term is here used, a rule may be defined as a legal direction which requires for its application nothing more than a determination
of the happening or non-happening of physical or mental events — that is,
determinations of fact.”); see also MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL
STUDIES 15 (1987); ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 126, at 158 (“A rule is
formal and mechanical.”).
129. N.Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW § 1192(2) (1996) (“Driving while intoxicated; per se. No person shall operate a motor vehicle while such person
has .10 of one per centum or more by weight of alcohol in the person’s blood as
shown by chemical analysis of such person’s blood, breath, urine or saliva.”).

File: PaulMacro.doc

428

Created on: 10/19/2003 8:42 PM

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

Last Printed: 11/22/2003 12:11 PM

[Vol. 29:1

tion by the judge of his own beliefs,130 and no risk of distortion of
the rule or its background policies.131 There exists much predictability in such a process, since the judge need only analyze
the facts, read the rule, and apply it.132
This high level of predictability benefits parties and players
throughout the legal process. First, rulemakers have greater
certainty that decisionmakers and members of society will consistently interpret the rules which they promulgate thereby better serving the policies of the society.133 Greater predictability
results in a more consistent legal system. Second, the use of
rules affords decisionmakers the luxury of avoiding the political
pressure and controversies that would otherwise arise from the
voice of skeptics,134 since the simplicity and clarity of the rule’s
application decreases the opportunity to second-guess the decisionmaker. Furthermore, although a particular outcome may
not be the desired result of the judge’s constituents or serve his
own political views, he will not be at liberty to impose his discretion beyond applying the particular rule to a set of facts.135
He thereby avoids the temptation of serving interests other
130. Sullivan, supra note 127, at 58 (“Rules force decisionmakers to dismiss
personal and political biases when deciding a matter thereby allowing the rule
itself as applied to the facts to determine the outcome.”).
131. ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 126, at 103 (“Rules work by restating moral principles in concrete terms, so as to reduce the uncertainty, error,
and controversy that result when individuals follow their own unconstrained
moral judgment.”).
132. Sullivan, supra note 127, at 62. Professor Kathleen M. Sullivan refers
to this mechanical nature of rules which affords much predictability within
the legal system as the “Fairness of Formal Equality.” Id. She goes on to say,
“Rules reduce the danger of official arbitrariness or bias by preventing decisionmakers from factoring the parties’ particular attractive or unattractive
qualities into the decision-making calculus.” Id.
133. Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards, 42 DUKE L.J. 577, 588 (1992).
134. Whether or not it is a desired result to have decisionmakers totally
unanswerable for the results of their decisions and to allow them to “wash
their hands” of an outcome is mentioned further in this section. One view on
this matter is that the judge may be inclined to “throw her hands up” after
applying a rule that does not necessarily promote the policies of the society in
a particular instance because the judge may feel she has no recourse in seeing
that justice is done. Such an approach renders the judge virtually ineffective
in promoting justice. This often leads to over- or under-inclusiveness.
135. HANKS ET AL., supra note 124, at 486 (“If the rule is valid, and if the
facts set forth by the rule arise, then the outcome presented by the rule must
stand.”).
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than the policies of society. Lastly, members of society can foresee the repercussions of their actions as well as the outcome of a
legal decision almost as easily as they can read the rule itself.
Since members can easily determine what behavior is acceptable and unacceptable they will begin to have more trust and
reliance in their legal system.136 Moreover, the predictability of
the rule affords them the opportunity to plan their activities
accordingly which allows the society to become more progressive.137 Thus, at first glance, the predictability made possible by
the use of rules has several desirable results.
There are, however, drawbacks to the use of rules. The main
problem with having a system of rules, which concerns most
legal theorists, is the result of over- and under-inclusiveness.138
The general nature of rules allows similar treatment of dissimilar people or, conversely, dissimilar treatment of like cases.139
The outcome that often arises is one that the rule–maker did
not foresee or want.140 For example, a strict rule will sometimes
136. KELMAN, supra note 128, at 41 (“Rules [ ] are designated to permit little
discretion; they ensure that people will perceive that they are treated uniformly.”).
137. Korobkin, supra note 124, at 25. See also RICHARD A. POSNER,
FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 220 (2001); Sullivan, supra note 127, at 123
n.259 (citing Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term — Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 10–11, 19–21
(1984) (“If a party knows that judges will not intervene to save her after the
consequences of her choices become apparent, she will plan more carefully and
greater productivity will result.”)).
138. POSNER, supra note 137, at 220. Over- and under-inclusiveness refers
to the “imperfect fit between the rule and circumstances, resulting in some
outcomes that are erroneous from the standpoint of the substantive principle
undergirding the rule.” Id. KELMAN, supra note 128, at 40. “Rules are bad
because they are under-inclusive as to purpose, over-inclusive as to purpose,
or both.” See also Korobkin, supra note 124, at 36 (“[W]hatever the underlying policy goal of the legal pronouncement, rules will often permit some undesirable conduct and prohibit some desirable conduct.”); Bernard W. Bell, Dead
Again: The Nondelegation Doctrine, The Rules/Standards Dilemma and The
Line Item Veto, 44 VILL. L. REV. 189, 199 (1999).
139. Sullivan, supra note 127, at 62. See also Bell, supra note 138, at 200
n.51.
140. KELMAN, supra note 128, at 15. Alexander & Sherwin offer an example
of under-inclusiveness and over-inclusiveness that explains the problem well.
ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 126, at 103. Say the rule, “No talking in
the library,” is established in order to promote study. The rule does not forbid
leaf blowers in the courtyard no matter how much they disrupt studying in
the library, because they are not “in the library.” They are in the courtyard.
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fail to stop behavior which the law aims to prevent, because one
particular detail of a given situation is not contemplated by the
rule. Consider the rule of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. Suppose a bicyclist is riding a bicycle on public roads
with a BAC above .10%. Such behavior can very well expose
innocent people as well as the bicyclist to danger. However, the
behavior is not covered under the law dealing with motor vehicles because a bicycle is man–powered.141 This detail will prevent law enforcement officials from prohibiting the type of behavior, which contradicts the underlying policy behind the rule
— keeping citizens free from danger on public roadways. On
the other hand, innocent persons may find that a rule does
cover their behavior even though the underlying policy behind
the rule does not target such behavior. Conversely, consider
someone who is driving faster than fifty-five miles per hour in
order to get his wife who is in labor or his child who is seriously
hurt to a hospital. Although he is “speeding” as defined in the
law, it is doubtful that the rulemakers intended to curtail such
behavior — at least not to such an extreme extent.142
There are other drawbacks to the use of rules. First, in providing legal direction, rulemakers cannot realistically conceive
every set of circumstances which require a rule.143 In a rule
Nor does the rule allow three people, who are the only people in the library, to
have an open study session within the library reading area. They are still
“talking in the library.” Id.
141. The scenario is an example of dissimilar treatment of like cases. Sullivan, supra note 127.
142. This is an example of similar treatment of dissimilar people.
143. Korobkin, supra note 124, at 36 (“[B]y their very nature, that is, because rules are specified ex ante, even complex rules will sometimes fail to
take account of all factual variations that might arise ex post, which might be
relevant to optimal tailoring of legal boundaries.”); Bell, supra note 138, at
199 (“[R]ules either cover situations or people that do not pose the harm that
the rule is intended to prevent, or they do not cover situations or people that
the statute is intended to reach.”). H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 127
(1961) (“Sometimes the sphere to be legally controlled is recognized from the
start as one in which the features of individual cases will vary so much…,that
uniform rules to be applied from case to case without further official direction
cannot usefully be framed by the legislature in advance.”). In fact, any promulgation of a successful rule is a considerable achievement for a legislature.
See HART, JR. & SACKS, supra note 126, at 139 (“When a legal proposition
functions successfully as a rule without the necessity of further elaboration, [ ]
some rather remarkable things have happened. The [ ] situation bringing the
rule into play has been accurately foreseen, and public policy with respect to it
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based system, for every particular set of circumstances, a rule
will either exist or it will not.144 If a rule does not exist, or it
does not cover the particular circumstances close enough to apply a “cookie-cutter” answer, the judge must still come to a decision.145 This acknowledgement leads to the reality that a judge
will invariably either “squeeze” a set of facts into a rule or use
discretion to come to a decision, thereby leaving holes in the
desired “mechanical” aspect of a system of rules.146 Second, the
very fact that a judge may “wash [his] hands” of the results of
applying a rule which a rule-making body has promulgated,
without ever having contemplated the particular parties in
question nor the accompanying set of facts, is an unsavory result in any sophisticated system of law. The judge undoubtedly
has the best perception of whether an act needs punishment
and which parties are innocent despite the outcome prescribed
by the rule. A strict rule will often curtail the decision maker’s
authority to see justice through. Third, members of society who
are knowledgeable of the law may promote their own interests
by skirting the line on the side of what is in fact legal but not
necessarily in the interests of society.147 Though not a violation
of the rule, the results do not promote the “spirit” of the law.148
Lastly, members who know and understand the law may also
fully determined in advance.”). Korobkin also makes the point that rulemakers may not even possess the capacity to make highly effective rules. Korobkin, supra, note 124, at 59 n.43 (citing Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision
of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65, 97–98 (1983) (“Selecting the optimally precise form for a given rule would seem to require qualities beyond the
reach of many administrators: selfless concern for the public good, consistent
goals, comprehensive vision, and accurate foresight. Real policymakers, by
contrast, are ordinary mortals burdened with incomplete knowledge, imperfect vision, and selfish desires.”)).
144. BENDITT, supra note 124, at 74. Rules act in an “all or nothing fashion.”
Id.
145. KELMAN, supra note 128, at 44.
146. Id. (“Rules inevitably have gaps and conflicts.”).
147. Korobkin, supra note 124, at 59 n.37 (citing Kennedy, supra note 123,
at 1773 (“Rules inform bad men exactly what they can get away with.”)); Bell,
supra note 138, at 200 (“Precise rules allow evasion.”); see also KELMAN, supra
note 128, at 41 (“Rules are bad because they enable a person to ‘walk the line,’
to use the rules to his own advantage, counterpurposely.”).
148. KELMAN, supra note 128, at 41 (“[U]njust outcomes will occur more
often because people will actively attempt to arrange their affairs so that they
are favored by the rules.”).
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find it in their best interest to use their superior knowledge to
take advantage of members who may not have either as high a
level of understanding of the law and are therefore at a disadvantage in society.
B. Standards
A standard is a general directive that requires behavior in
conformance with a society’s well-known principles or policies.
A standard requires a decision-making body to determine
whether an action conforms to the standard’s criteria.149 The
following is one accepted definition of a standard:
A legal directive is “standard”-like when it tends to collapse
decision-making back into the direct application of the background principle or policy to a fact situation. Standards allow
for the decrease of errors of under- and over-inclusiveness by
giving the decisionmaker more discretion than do rules. Standards allow the decisionmaker to take into account all relevant factors or the totality of the circumstances. Thus, the
application of a standard in one case ties the decisionmaker’s
hand in the next case less than does a rule — the more facts
one may take into account, the more likely that some of them
will be different the next time.150

149. Eric A. Posner, Standards, Rules, and Social Norms, 21 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 101 (1997).
150. HANKS ET AL., supra note 124, at 45; Sullivan, supra note 127, at 58.
See also HART, JR. & SACKS, supra note 126, at 139 (“A standard may be defined broadly as a legal direction which can be applied only by making, in
addition to a finding of what happened or is happening in the particular situation, a qualitative appraisal of those happenings in terms of their probable
consequences, moral justification, or other aspect of general human experience.”). Roscoe Pound calls attention to three characteristics of legal standards:
1) They all involve a certain moral judgment upon conduct. It is to be
“fair,” or “conscientious,” or “reasonable,” or “prudent,” or “diligent.”
2) They do not call for exact legal knowledge exactly applied, but for
common sense about common things or trained intuition about things
outside of everyone’s experience.
3) They are not formulated absolutely and given an exact content, either by legislation or by judicial decision, but are relative to times
and places and circumstances and are to be applied with reference to
the facts of the case in hand.
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The use of standards, therefore, unlike a rule, allows a judge
to use his or her discretion during the decision-making process.151 The benefit is that the law no longer requires the judge to
force a particular rule into a set of facts whether or not the outcome is the desired result of the underlying policy.152 An example of a standard is the New York law which prohibits people
from driving “in an intoxicated condition.”153 Pursuant to this
law, the judge may consider all of the relevant facts surrounding the situation in question (even beyond BAC) and make a
determination according to the appropriate societal standard.154
Due to this use of discretion, standards are much more flexible
than rules155 allowing judges to treat like cases alike156 and conversely, no longer forcing similar treatment of dissimilar people.
Advocates who view the use of discretion as an acceptable
ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 118 (1922);
Kennedy, supra note 123, at 1688 (providing examples of standards: good
faith, due care, fairness, unconscionability, unjust enrichment, and reasonableness).
151. Sullivan, supra note 127, at 66. Professor Sullivan describes the process as “Fairness as Substantive Justice.” Id.
152. HANKS ET AL., supra note 124, at 486 (asserting that standards do not
“set out legal consequences that follow automatically when the conditions
provided are met.”); HART, JR. & SACKS, supra note 126, at 140 (“Unlike a
rule, the application of a standard requires [ ] more than a determination [of
mere] events. It requires a comparison of the quality or tendency of what
happened in the particular instance with what is believed to be the quality or
tendency of happenings in like situations.”). The process to determine
whether a driver has driven “no faster than is reasonable” entails the adjudicator investigating “the range of relevant driving conditions and apply[ing]
the background principle of reasonableness to the situation.” Korobkin, supra
note 124, at 23.
153. N.Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW § 1192(3) (1996) (“Driving while intoxicated. No person shall operate a motor vehicle while in an intoxicated
condition.”).
154. HANKS ET AL., supra note 124, at 486 (“[A standard] states a reason that
argues in one direction, but does not necessitate a particular decision. … [The]
principle is one which officials must take into account, if it is relevant, as a
consideration inclining in one direction or another.”). See also BIX, supra note
123, at 81; J.G. RIDDALL, JURISPRUDENCE 95 (1991).
155. BIX, supra note 123, at 81 (“In contrast to rules, [standards] do not act
in an all-or-nothing fashion: that is, they can apply to a case without being
dispositive.”); ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 126, at 158 (proposing that
standards “are flexible, context-sensitive legal norms that require evaluative
judgments in their application”).
156. Sullivan, supra note 127, at 66.
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method of judicial decision-making, see the application of standards as providing a greater opportunity to promote justice.157
There are other benefits to the application of standards and
the increased use of discretion. First, the acceptance of judicial
discretion and the flexibility that comes with it also allow the
rule-making body to rely more on the ability of the decisionmaking body to make just decisions. This, in turn, relieves the
rule-making body from the task of developing an intricate body
of rules ex ante — before the behavior takes place — to fit
countless sets of possible circumstances.158 The task of addressing the countless varying situations falls on the decisionmaking body who must now interpret some common sense societal standard post ante — after the behavior takes place —
and apply it to a particular set of facts. Under the driving “in
an intoxicated condition” standard, the decisionmaker may look
toward imposing penalties against those drivers whose BAC
was not above .10%, but nevertheless placed people’s lives in
danger while operating a motor vehicle after drinking alcohol.159
Second, standards provide the desired result of requiring a decisionmaker to accept his responsibility and his decisions.160
Standards negate the possibility of the decisionmaker “washing
his hands” of the result because “there was nothing he could
do.” With standards, the decisionmaker faces much more pressure to consider all the circumstances. In short, standards “af-

157. Korobkin, supra note 124, at 37 (“If standards are applied precisely, no
desirable behavior will be sanctioned and no undesirable behavior will avoid
sanction.”). Of course, there is an underlying contradiction in the arguments
for the use of a rule or standard when considering discretion. Proponents of
rules do not want discretion playing a role in the decision-making process.
Proponents of discretion see it as a necessity in the process. The discrepancy
is resolved by understanding that the bias towards a rule or standard lies in
whether the person believes discretion is a good thing or an evil thing.
158. HART, JR. & SACKS, supra note 126, at 140 (“Even more obviously than
the [ ] rule, the standard involves a postponement of decision until the matter
can be judged from the perspective of the point of application. Indeed, [it]
avoids [ ] the imprisonment of general judgment in any precise verbal formula.”).
159. The decisionmaker can promote a society’s underlying policies to the
extent that the rulemakers originally intended. In this case, the judge can
provide safety to those people using public streets even though an intoxicated
driver may not have exceeded the legal limit for BAC.
160. Sullivan, supra note 127, at 67.
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firm rather than deny…[the] responsibility” of decisionmakers161
to promote justice through their use of discretion.
Although the use of standards and the addition of judicial
discretion bring a decrease in predictability, such a situation
may promote desired results in terms of members of society following a general policy itself. People will not know the exact
line between what is legal and what is illegal,162 due both to the
addition of judicial discretion and the vague nature of standards
themselves. 163 They will not be able to intentionally keep their
actions narrowly within the confines of a rule in order to further
their own interests.164 They will therefore have to act according
to the intended purpose of the standard or risk acting in a
manner which a judge may interpret as unacceptable under
their society’s standards. Also, people will no longer possess the
tools to exploit the less informed.165 Everyone must act within
the confines of the standard that their society deems appropriate, instead of one party having the advantage of knowledge of
a line clearly defined by law.
However, the lack of clarity surrounding standards may, of
course, lead to undesirable behavior. Some people may fail to
act in a cautious manner and stray too far into the gray area of
the standard which leads to illegal behavior.166 Also, rulemakers may find that persons who wish to conform to the standards
of their society and behave in a legal manner may be unable to
interpret exactly what those standards are.167 Unintentional

161. Id. (quoting Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term —
Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 34 (1986)).
162. HART, JR. & SACKS, supra note 126, at 140. The meaning of standards
such as “reckless,” “generally fair and equitable,” and “due care” depends upon
the feeling for the particular type of situation of the individual standard–
applier. Different appliers may apply them differently. The standard thus
represents a much looser form of control than the rule. Id.
163. ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 126, at 29. Standards “contain
vague or controversial moral or evaluative terms in their formulations. Persons attempting to conform to standards must be able to resolve for themselves the application of these vague or controversial moral and evaluative
terms.” Id.
164. Korobkin, supra note 124, at 26.
165. Sullivan, supra note 127, at 66.
166. Korobkin, supra note 124, at 37.
167. ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 126, at 29 (“The standards do not
improve their ability to determine what they need to determine.”); KELMAN,
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illegal behavior would become a problem or legal behavior may
be foreborn.168 As a result of the lack of clarity, people may also
have less ability to plan their actions169 due to fear of breaking
the law. The lack of clarity would, in effect, force people to act
in an overly cautious manner by curtailing their behavior170
thereby stunting the growth of society. Caused by a lack of
clarity within the law, these are obviously not the desired results of an effective legal system.171
Finally, the decrease in the clarity of the laws which embody
the legal system can also result in a threat to the application of
justice itself.172 With the decreased clarity of the law, judges
would have a greater opportunity to inject their own biases or
politics into the decision-making process. The judge’s decisions
may change on a case-by-case basis, pursuant to the judge’s
whim173 through a manipulation of the law, thereby resulting in
the dissimilar treatment of similar people.174 Furthermore, even
if a judge’s own biases do not effect the decision-making process,
the politics of the society may prove to be a compelling force
supra note 128, at 43 (“Standards are bad because they give people no clear
warning about the consequences of their behavior.”).
168. Korobkin, supra note 124, at 37; see also id. at 59 n.41 (citing Robert E.
King & Cass R. Sunstein, Doing Without Speed Limits, 79 B.U. L. REV. 155,
164–67 (1999) (“Montana’s ‘reasonable and prudent’ speeding law increased
unreasonable and imprudent driving because of lack of clarity.”)). If parties
require a higher authority to interpret standards because they cannot resolve
for themselves the applications of the moral principles that they subscribe to,
then the parties will not be helped by these standards. ALEXANDER &
SHERWIN, supra note 126, at 29.
169. KELMAN, supra note 128, at 43.
170. Korobkin, supra note 124, at 38; Sullivan, supra note 127, at 123 n.257
(citing Bagett v. Billitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964) (“Those…sensitive to the
perils posed by … indefinite language, avoid the risk…only by restricting their
conduct to that which is unquestionably safe.”)).
171. Korobkin, supra note 124, at 33 (“If precisely drawn law encourages
socially desirable behavior and discourages socially undesirable behavior.”).
172. POSNER, supra note 137, at 220 (“[Uncertainty] may invite judicial corruption, whether financial or political, by making it difficult for outsiders to
determine whether a judicial decision is in accordance with the law.”); see also
KELMAN, supra note 128, at 41 (“Standards are bad because they are subject
to arbitrary and /or prejudicial enforcement.”).
173. Korobkin, supra note 124, at 38; see also KELMAN, supra note 128, at 62
(discussing the fear of a judges whim, “A reliance on standards is premised on
the hope of moral dialogue and ultimate consensus.”).
174. Bell, supra note 138, at 201.
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upon the judge’s interpretation and application of the standard.
Surmounting political pressure, either from those in power who
put the judge on the bench or even from constituents, may force
the judge to make a decision one way or another whether or not
that choice is the just one. In such a situation, whether or not
discretion allows justice to prevail becomes a formidable question.
C. Theories Applying the Rules vs. Standards Debate
1. Crystals and Mud
Property law has always had a basis of clearly defined and
well-known doctrines, or rules.175 However, these rules often
find themselves transformed into less distinct rules, or even
standards, through exceptions and other forms of judicial discretion.176 Therefore, just as is common in other areas of law,
within property law at any given time we will find both rules
and standards. In her presentation of the structural and practical differences between rules and standards in property law
Professor Carol M. Rose argues:
rules (crystals) will better order arms-length transactions
among players in the marketplace, whereas standards (mud)
will better order transactions among players known to each
other through repeat or customary interchange. In other
words, [the theory calls for] individualism (rules or crystals)
for the market [and] altruism (standards or mud) for the mercantile family or clan.177

As stated above, the result of the differences between rules
and standards is that the use of each of these legal directives
becomes advantageous in markedly distinct scenarios. Rules
are better suited in a marketplace setting where parties do not
deal with each other regularly and may not ever deal with each
other again. In that instance, the advantage is the availability
175. Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV.
577 (1988).
176. Id. at 578. In fact, it is a circular process which continues with legislatures shoring up the now “muddied” rules with new more precise rules — and
the process continues. Id.
177. Sullivan, supra note 127, at 123 n.283 (discussing Rose, supra note
175).
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of clear guidelines that allow people to protect themselves from
the trickery of others. Standards are seen as a better fit in a
family or clan-like group. In such an organization, parties that
deal with each other on a regular basis, thereby building relationships, can take advantage of more fluid guidelines by which
to interact. People develop a sense of whom they can trust, and
therefore take business or social risks, and whom they cannot
trust, and therefore either choose to not deal with the other
party at all or deal under a heightened sense of cautiousness.
2. Vices and Virtues
Professor Pierre J. Schlag identifies what he refers to as
“perhaps the most common understanding of the rules v. standards dialectic,” which are the virtues and vices that come with
selecting either a rule or standard as a form of legal order.178
When certainty, uniformity, stability, and security are required,
rules are more prudent; when flexibility, individualization,
open-endedness, and dynamism are important, standards are
thought to be the more suitable choice.179 The determining factor when deciding whether to implement rules or standards becomes which of these competing virtues are most desirable for a
particular circumstance.180
Professor Schlag also lists the objectives that a legal directive
can serve: deterrence, allocation, communication, delegation,
and inducement.181 When attempting to promote these possible
objectives by creating a particular law, however, the entity
crafting the legal directive should not ignore competing objectives which are often also desired.182 To state two, the competing objective of delegation is control; that of deterrence is empowerment.183 So, for example, when a legal directive is promulgated to promote delegation, the rule-making body must be
mindful of not relinquishing all control, thereby foiling any
sense of a hierarchal system. Likewise, when a directive is

178. Pierre J. Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 400
(1985).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 401.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 402.
183. Schlag, supra note 178, at 402.
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promulgated to deter behavior, the rule-making body must also
allow members of the society enough freedom to act, so that
growth continues and the society is not stifled.
3. Costs
a. Frequency of Occurrence
The decision behind the promulgation of rules and standards
also presents several economic questions. Promulgating rules is
often more costly ex ante than standards, whereas standards
are more costly to apply ex post.184 Rules require information
and discussion in order to determine what conduct is permissible.185 Standards require decisionmakers to undertake a determination of the legal issues as well as the facts.186 Thus, the
decision to utilize rules or standards often depends on the resources needed to effectuate each.
Professor Lisa Kaplow asserts that the answer to the question of whether to promulgate rules for a particular set of circumstances or to allow standards to provide the direction to a
society and its legal decision-making body often lies in a determination of the frequency of the occurrence.187 When conduct is
frequent, it is prudent to formulate a rule to provide direction
on the acceptable kind of conduct. The cost of the promulgating
such a rule is justified since it will save resources in the long
run due to the repetitiveness of the adjudicating process.188
When conduct is infrequent, allowing a judge to apply a standard to an uncommon situation is often the more economic and
therefore the more appropriate approach. Society will apply
fewer resources to those particular circumstances in the aggre-

184. Kaplow, supra note 133, at 557.
185. Id. at 559; Korobkin, supra note 124, at 32.
186. Kaplow, supra note 133, at 559; Korobkin, supra note 124, at 32.
187. Kaplow, supra note 133, at 621 (“The central factor influencing the
desirability of rules and standards is the frequency with which a law will govern conduct.”).
188. Korobkin, supra note 124, at 33 (“In such circumstances, the cost of
matching a set of facts to a legal consequence is borne only once, when the
rule is promulgated, and the cost is then amortized over a large number of
transactions.”).
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gate, 189 because devising the standard will require few resources
and the infrequency of the conduct will ensure that the costs of
applying the standard do not become excessive. Once the rulemaking body decides whether the conduct in question occurs
frequently, it can then decide to utilize a rule or rely on a standard.190
b. Homogeneity and Behavior Deterred
Closely related to the question of the frequency that a conflict
will arise and the cost of promulgating legal directives is the
characteristic of homogeneity. When factual circumstances are
homogeneous, rules tend to work well, because a single line denoting acceptable and unacceptable behavior addresses many
situations well and will work in its intended manner more often
than not.191 However, when events are heterogeneous with numerous factors leading up to a particular behavior, rules will
often have over- and under-inclusive results exposing the shortcomings and unfairness of a rigid legal system.192 Thus standards are often more appropriate when dealing with varying
sets of circumstances, because a standard allows a decisionmaker to keep in mind many more factors when deciding a matter.
V. THE RULES AND STANDARDS DEBATE APPLIED TO THE
STABILITY AND GROWTH PACT
As stated, the purpose of this Note is to offer some insight on
the EMU by asking the question of which legal form, either rule
or standard, would most likely provide a stable (and prosper189. Id. (“Standards will be relatively desirable when a type of dispute
arises infrequently, because the larger initial investment in rule promulgation
will be amortized over fewer disputes, and, conversely case-by-case analysis of
the problem will not result in an excessive duplication of effort.”).
190. Cost may not be the EU’s primary concern of whether to promulgate
rules or standards. It may not even be a concern of the EU at all. However,
like the analogy highlighting the differences of a mercantile and a clan, taking
the frequency of an occurrence into consideration also provides helpful insights for the EU relating to the implementation of rules and standards.
191. Korobkin, supra note 124, at 37.
192. Bell, supra note 138, at 226 n.47 (noting REED DICKERSON, THE
INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 49–50 (1975) (“Universal
enforcement of rigid rules can lead to anarchic and disruptive results.”)).
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ous) future for the EMU. The Stability and Growth Pact, the
vehicle for the analysis of rules and standards, places several
requirements on the subscribing Member States. This Note will
determine whether the provisions in our example, the Stability
and Growth Pact, are rules or standards. The Note will initially
consider each legal directive individually; though, it will later
concentrate on the most relevant provisions of the Pact in continuing the analysis of the pros and cons of each provision. In
considering the rules versus standards debate as applied to the
Stability and Growth Pact this Note will offer conclusions as to
which may better serve the goals of the EMU.
A. The Stability and Growth Pact – Rule or Standard
The section of the Pact describing the sanctions that the
ECOFIN Counsel will impose is the Pact’s most standard-like
section. The sanctions require that the Member States make an
initial non–interest bearing deposit of .2 to .5% of the country’s
GDP.193 The Pact does not mention exactly what criteria the
ECOFIN Council will use to determine whether a Member
State will pay .2% or .5% or some variable in between. Most
likely, the Council will consider the severity of the violation
(how far the Member States budget exceeds the 3% budgetary
limit) and the surrounding circumstances of the violation in
terms of the economic situation within the country. This sequence of events exemplifies the definition of a standard in that
the decisionmaker will be able to consider all applicable facts194
when deciding the party’s fate.
The central element of the Stability and Growth Pact generally requires members to keep their budgets “close to balance or
in surplus.” This wording allows for wide interpretation.
Within the first three years of the Pact’s existence, the requirement has been interpreted to mean that Member States
should “avoid excessive budget deficit during a cyclical downturn.” The directive seems standard–like in that it would avoid
over- and under-inclusiveness by allowing more discretion than
would a rule.195 In this case, European Commission should be

193. Meyers & Levie, supra note 41, at *8.
194. HANKS ET AL., supra note 124, at 486–88.
195. Id.
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able to consider all applicable facts196 when considering a Member State’s budgetary position. However, the directive becomes
more rule-like as one considers the requirements which underlie the “excessive budget deficit” standard. In order for Member
States to “avoid an excessive budget” they must keep their
budget deficits below the 3% limit for a given year. The limit
has developed into a prerequisite for a members budget to be
“close to balance or in surplus.”197 This strictly interpreted limit
leads to the conclusion that the directive is actually more rule–
like upon its application.
Council Regulation 1466/97 dealing with the surveillance of
the budgetary positions and the economic policies198 of Member
States is most certainly rule-like in its nature. A legal directive
is rule-like when it binds a decisionmaker to respond to a case
in a determinate way due to the presence of surrounding triggering facts.199 This Regulation is a rule in that it carefully delineates the requirements for submitting each member’s stability program. As stated previously, the Regulation outlines the
rules concerning the content, submission, examination, and
monitoring of those programs.200 The Regulation leaves little
question to how a Member State must report its financial performance and plans and what should be included in them. If
Member States do not follow the prescribed method of reporting, the ECOFIN Counsel could easily find a violation by
quickly referring to these rules.
Council Regulation 1467/97 concerning the speed and clarification of the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure
is also rule-like in nature. As previously mentioned, the regulation provides a clear method for prompt corrective actions by
the ECOFIN Council within a carefully pre-determined timetable.201 The regulation outlines the times by which the Council
must submit recommendations to a Member State as well as
periods by which the Member State’s government must act
upon those recommendations. Again, should the Member State
not follow the recommendations by the Council in a sufficient or
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Id.
Frandsen, supra note 39.
Lembergen & Wachenfeld, supra note 7, at 31–32.
HANKS ET AL., supra note 124, at 486–88.
Lembergen & Wachenfeld, supra note 7, at 32.
Id.

File: PaulMacro.doc

2003]

Created on: 10/19/2003 8:42 PM

Last Printed: 11/22/2003 12:11 PM

ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION

443

timely manner, the violation will easily reveal itself against the
backdrop of these clearly defined rules.
B. Should the Pact Consist of Rules or Standards?
For purposes of the analysis on whether standards or rules
are more suitable to the EMU, this Note will concentrate on the
more substantive requirements of the Stability and Growth
Pact concerning the deficit limit provision (a rule) and the sanctioning provision (a standard).202 These provisions deal with a
Member State’s financial performance under the Pact and the
Council’s required response, respectively.
1. Keeping Budget Deficits Close to Balance
As mentioned previously, Professor Goebel has identified the
objective of the Pact as deterrence.203 As shown by applying Professor Schlag’s “vices and virtues” theory to Professor Goebel’s
view, if the “virtue” of deterrence is the goal, legislatures should
act cautiously in order to sufficiently provide members of their
society with the freedom to continue to act productively. Legislatures should not stop socially or economically desirable conduct. While they must not deter certain conduct, they must do
so in a way that empowers the parties within their domain to
perform other desired conduct.
The Pact will surely deter Member States from allowing
budget deficits from growing excessively. The reason for keeping budget deficits lower is to bring stability and credibility to
the newly introduced euro.204 To the prudent mind, rules seem
to be the answer for a legal system which requires certainty,
stability, and security. Rules provide the clarity needed for sta202. The two regulations supporting the Council Resolution outlining the
budgetary limits are more procedural than substantive in nature in that they
outline the reporting requirements of the Member State and the time constraints of both the ECOFIN Council and the Member States. They provide
the European Commission and the ECOFIN Council great oversight as to a
country’s financial performance. They also provide clear and executable goals
both for the Member States in relation to the reporting process under the Pact
as well as for the Council in proposing corrections in case of a violation. Thus,
although procedural in nature, the regulations are surely important in regard
to the Pact’s effectiveness and overall success.
203. Goebel, supra note 42, at *4.
204. Mundell, supra note 1.
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bility, which is undoubtedly a large (likely the underlying) reason why the EU decided to promulgate such clear rules for the
Pact.205
However, the EU will most certainly have to take other factors into consideration. This is a European Monetary “Union,”
which now consists of twelve different nations with twelve very
different economies, cultures and governments.206 According to
Professor Schlag, the EU should allow for some degree of flexibility and individualization so that the economies of the Member States and the European economy do not stagnate while
boasting the euro. Therefore, open-endedness and dynamism
should also play a part in the EMU’s legal order. While keeping
the euro stable by deterring excessive deficits, the Pact should
also provide for empowerment in order to allow the governments to accept some level of risk and the ability to maneuver
within their economies in order to spur growth.207
According to the current limit on budget deficits under the
Pact, Member States will most likely try to keep their deficits
well below 3% in order not to receive a warning from the
ECOFIN Counsel as Germany did early this year when its
budget deficit was at 2.7%.208 But this type of deterrence, in
fact, may stifle economies when they have opportunities to grow
or further hinder them when they have come upon times of recession as we see occurring in Germany today. If this is the
effect that the Pact has, it is lacking the type of empowerment
Professor Schlag calls for in his analysis.209 The EU could grant
205. Lembergen & Wachenfeld, supra note 7, at 31.
206. Christopher Rhoads, EU Panel’s Solbes Says Fines Won’t Be Automatic
For Breaking 3% GDP Rule, WALL ST. J. EUR., Jul. 25, 2003, available at 2003
WL-WSJE 59766557. GUIDE, supra note 2, at ch. 1 (“On January 1, 2001,
Greece joined this group after meeting the Maastricht ‘convergence criteria.’”).
207. Schlag, supra note 178, at 402.
208. Sesit, supra note 91.
209. However, the costs in question deal with whether or not the deterring
of behavior by an over-inclusive rule will be a great loss to society. There may
always exist the situation where deterrence of certain behavior is not a dire
consequence. See Sullivan, supra note 127, at 63 (“A utilitarian argument for
rules reflects the judgment that the gains they elicit from the ‘industrious and
rational’ will exceed the losses from the antisocial exploitation of bright
lines.”); Kennedy, supra note 123, at 1689 (“If we adopt a rule, it is because of
a judgment that this kind of arbitrariness is less serious than the arbitrariness and uncertainty that would result from empowering the official to apply
the standard of “free will” directly to the facts of each case.”).
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the Member States of the EMU the empowerment needed to
run their complex economies by either promulgating a less
strict rule (for example, a 4 or 5 percent budget deficit ceiling)
or possibly a “reasonableness”210 standard.
Professor Rose’s “crystals and mud” analysis of rules and
standards seems to lead the EU down a similar path towards
more standard-like directives. Rose asserts that rules are more
suited to a market setting where parties do not deal with each
other regularly, while standards are a better fit in a family or
clan-like group where parties do deal with each other on a regular basis.211 There are obviously differences between property
law, to which Professor Rose applied the rules vs. standards
debate, and international monetary law, which governs the
EMU. However, recognizing the different dynamics, which exist within the “marketplace” and the “clan,” as presented by
Professor Rose, poses interesting insights into the analysis of
the EU and its Pact. To say that the Members States of EU
have had differences in the past is an understatement; however,
the Members are undoubtedly not “strangers” in any sense of
the word. To the contrary, they more closely represent members of a “mercantile family” or “clan,” and the EU (once referred to as the European “Community”) surely embodies the
“customary” interchange, which exists within such entities —
especially on an economic level. The purpose behind forming
the EU was to create a customs union where barriers to trade
where eliminated thus producing a region where cross-border
trade is commonplace.212 Though there have been political differences the nations which make up the EU and people who live
within those nations deal with their continental neighbors on a
regular basis (be it for business or social purposes) and have
done so for centuries. Due to the effect of globalization on the
world economy, if the EU desires to continue to have a leadership role on the global stage, its members must continue to turn
to each other and provide market share and other financial

210. Pound, supra note 150.
211. Sullivan, supra note 127, at 123 n.283.
212. THE EUROPEAN UNION: A GUIDE FOR AMERICANS ch. 1 (2002), at
http://www.eurunion.org/infores/euguide/euguide.pdf (last visited Jan. 15,
2003) [hereinafter GUIDE].
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support to their neighbors.213 This reliance on each other is a
fact of the EU’s existence today, and it is unlikely to change in
the near or distant future.
The fact that the European continent is a region built inherently on international relationships, which the formation of the
EU has strengthened, leads to an additional point under Professor Rose’s theory. Of course a Member State may, in fair
dealing, try to get the “best deal” for itself from these “family”
type circumstances. However, in drawing an analogy to a marketplace setting, it is unlikely that one nation will intentionally
“scheme” to break an EU treatise and run away with the “loot,”
as the situation may occur in a marketplace. Rather, due to
proximity and practicality the Member State will have to remain within the “family” of states and most likely make reparations to the other members for its violations. The most likely
scenario is that a Member State would not risk alienation from
its neighboring states by deliberately or even negligently breaking an EU law, because the next day, that Member State would
still have to turn to its fellow members for the same market
share and financial support. The risk of alienation from its
neighbors is great and likely to pose serious consequences to
consider before undertaking such actions. Therefore, Member
States, as part of a larger economic family, should not need the
added protection that rules afford.

213. Although the goal of the Pact is to promote economic stability within
the region (as well as to bring stability to the euro) the ultimate goal is to
achieve prominence on the world economic stage. The EU wants the euro to
become an international currency. Europeans want foreign investors to invest
in their countries. Of course, such interchanges can no longer be likened to a
“family” relationship. The continuance and growth of the euro by foreigners
as well as foreign investment within the EU surely represent more closely the
situation present in a marketplace setting where parties are dealing at armslength with each other, possibly never to deal with each other again (at least
for a long time). Such a scenario seems to call for the use of rules in order to
ensure fair dealing on both sides of the transaction. Nevertheless, the situation does not affect the interaction between the members of the EU. The
World Trade Organization promulgates international trade laws to be followed by its members in order to promote fair dealing. However, the EU still
has the responsibility of prescribing laws within its borders in order to regulate the economic performance of its own Member States, and in so doing, it
has the luxury of implementing standards due to their interdependent relations with each other.
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Under Professor Rose’s description of the “crystals and mud”
theory, it seems that the best form of legislation for such a
close-knit organization is the standard.214 A mud, or a standards-based regime takes into consideration ongoing interaction
between parties over time (as is present in the EU) more than a
rules-based regime. Crystals or rules as the medium for contact
between strangers are “hardhearted and mean spirited [in that]
they glorify the attitude of self-centeredness and ‘me first.’ “215
To the contrary, Member States must work together over time
in order to complement and assist one another in building each
other’s economies. While one nation is in recession another
may be in a state of inflation. In another three or four years,
the tide may turn and the Members may find themselves on the
opposite side of the scale looking at the very problems that its
neighbor had just faced. The situation should allow Member
States greater ability to deal with each other’s shortcomings
together.
The imprudence of initially attempting to devise a rule ex
ante for eleven (or more) nations with different and changing
economies offers further support for the use of standards in the
EMU. A rule promulgated ex ante would lead to less cooperative dialogue between nations, more finger pointing, as well as
more nations looking out for themselves.216 Considering that the
very point of establishing the EU was to foster a climate of cooperation, it is evident that finger pointing is not the goal of the
Pact. A “reasonable budget deficit” in light of a Member State’s
economic situation may have been a more manageable solution
and, in fact, a solution tailored more to an organization whose
members rely so heavily on each other. Thus, Member State’s
lasting relationships and future common goals could allow them
to follow a standards-based regime without getting into a spitting contest. In fact, a standard-like directive may promote
214. KELMAN, supra note 128, at 16 (“The rule form is said to express the
substantive ideals of those committed to self–reliance and individualism….
The willingness to resort to the standard form is said to correspond to the
embrace of substantive altruism.”).
215. Rose, supra note 175, at 605.
216. Id. at 607 (“To adopt a rhetoric of crystal rules, then, seems to be a way
of denying the necessary dialog character of human interactions and acting as
if we can compel human behavior by a perfect specification of unchanging
rights and obligations.”).
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even greater cooperation between Member States as an outgrowth of the need to work together and understand each others’ economic circumstances — or else risk failure.217 As continued application of standards often leads to clearly defined directives, the EU could eventually set more stringent rules that are
proven suitable to its Members’ needs once the ECOFIN Counsel and the Member States have tested the viability of the stability programs and the standards underlying the Pact. Therefore, the crystals and mud theory lends to the idea that the EU
should have relied more heavily on standards for the substantive parts of the Pact.
However, looking at the situation through a costs and frequency analysis leads to quite contrary views. As long as the
Stability and Growth Pact aims to regulate the Member States
within the EMU, the task of balancing budgets will always be a
concern of nations within the EU. Moreover, as long as the
EMU is a functioning institution, the ECOFIN Counsel will
continuously be evaluating at least twelve stability programs
(and three convergence programs for the non-participating EU
countries). The rule approach will allow the Counsel to evaluate each Member State each year without having to establish
new law each time a unique situation arises. It must merely
monitor the budgets in order to determine whether or not a nation has kept its budget close to balance and begin the sanctioning process when the facts tell them otherwise.218 In this regard
the EU was correct in promulgating the Pact as a specifically
delineated rule.
When considering the costs of promulgating a rule or a standard, however, the EU should also have taken into account the
homogeneity factor, as well as the differences of the nations
comprising the EMU. The EU has already witnessed several of
its Members States flirting with violations of the 3% budget
deficit limit and there will undoubtedly be more. For example,
Portugal has already broken the 3% budget deficit limit and
Germany is coming dangerously close to doing the same. With
so many different business practices and economic systems
217. See KELMAN, supra note 128, at 62 (“A reliance on standards is premised on the hope of moral dialogue and ultimate consensus.”).
218. Furthermore, they can do all of this without allowing politics or national biases to interfere with the evaluation process.
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within the EMU, the chances are low that even two states
which break the deficit limit will do so for exactly the same reasons. Thus, taking the complex factors of politics, culture, and
even economics into account the Member States of the EMU are
indeed not homogeneous. Some of these nations which fail to
keep their budget deficits below 3% GDP may surely deserve to
pay sanctions for frivolous spending and relying on their
neighbors, while other Members may not deserve to pay sanctions upon consideration of their underlying economic circumstances. This rule–like provision may very well call for the imposition of sanctions in an over-inclusive and undeserved manner.
This point leads us to some of the basic reasons behind employing a rule or standard, which the EU most likely considered
as well. First, as the budget deficit provision of the Pact is a
rule, it is also predictable. As we have seen with Portugal and
Germany, the European Commission can easily determine
when a Member State is not abiding by the pact and not keeping its budget close to balance because their deficits are close to
3% GDP. When Portugal and Germany received their initial
warnings about their budgetary performance, there was little
talk about politics or biases from the ECOFIN Counsel. As it
stands, the Pact leaves little room for politics or biases. Lastly,
since the two nations knew that they had exceeded the budgetary limits, they could not be surprised about receiving the
warnings. Moreover, Portugal and Germany have not been able
to keep their deficits below 3% GDP, but other Member States,
knowing exactly what the limit is, have been able to keep their
budgets low by planning accordingly.
As long as Member States plan to (and do) keep their budgets
well below the 3% ceiling, the rule will seem effective. However, when members begin breaching the 3% ceiling, which is
the present state of affairs, the Pact virtually ties the hands of
the European Commission and the ECOFIN Counsel, for it
leaves little discretion to its decisionmakers. The two bodies
will not have the liberty to look into the underlying circumstances in order to determine the reasons for the spending.
Once the Member State has breached the 3% ceiling, the Commission and the Counsel will have to abide by the process prescribed by the Pact and require the nation to pay sanctions or
render the Pact insignificant. The preciseness of the rule may
also lead to less than desirable behavior on the part of the
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members of the EMU. Member States may begin to “plan” to
keep their budgets below 3% limit — just not so far below the
limit. If many members begin to flirt with the 3% ceiling simultaneously, the consequences could prove drastic for the EMU.
Nations may begin to feel that a warning is harmless as long as
they do not venture into the realm where sanctions are imposed. Conversely, a nation that is struggling to keep its economy afloat will find that a mere warning is of small consequences. If a nation is struggling and on the verge of a major
recession, the nation’s political and economic leader will have to
make a choice between allowing their economy to slide further
into recession or complying with the Pact and facing large sanctions.
Requiring Member States to abide by a standard such as
“reasonable budget deficit” would help to avoid this situation.
The Commission and Counsel would be able to look at the nation’s stability program and use discretion to determine
whether the problem emerged through the lack of frugality
within the nation’s decisionmakers or through unavoidable economic cycles.
The EU could avoid over- and underinclusiveness much more readily. The two bodies would no
longer have to allow the “similar treatment of dissimilar [nations].”219 Furthermore, there would be no clear line for Member
States to skirt. Member States would have to act within the
“spirit” of the Pact. Nations would not have to keep their budgets “close to balance” merely by keeping their deficits below 3%
GDP. The Commission and Counsel would have the tools and
the authority to determine whether a nation is clearly abusing
its right to keep a deficit when that nation has no dire need to
keep a deficit, whether or not the nation is below the 3% limit.
The lack of a definitive interpretation of the Pact, however,
could very well lead to the problems of uncertainty described in
Part IV. Nations could delve into the gray area of what is a
“reasonable budget deficit” and try to show that they do in fact
have a reasonable deficit given their country’s circumstances.
Such a situation could lead to a heated dialogue between Member States and the EU possibly causing ever increasing political
consequences. Other members, without clearer guidance, would
loose the ability to make sufficient economic plans for the fu219. Sullivan, supra note 127, at 62.
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ture. Nations would tend to be even more cautious with their
budgets than they would have with a clearly defined deficit ceiling. This would stunt productivity and harm the economy.
Lastly, the European Commission and the ECOFIN Counsel
may also begin making decisions based on political pressure or
personal biases.
Obviously, the pros and cons of using standards or rules are
extremely intertwined and difficult to divide. Perhaps the best
way to answer the rules or standards question is to consider
some of the recent developments of the Pact. Given that the
Pact is already three years old and has been through several of
its own cycles of “ups” and “downs,” the luxury of hindsight exists. On September 9, 2002, the German government stated
that its country would honor its budgetary promises and comply
with the Pact.220 At the same time, the French Prime Minister
claimed that there was growth in his country’s economy which
would allow the government to keep its deficit below the 3%
limit.221 If these promises had become reality, even in the face of
hard economic times and surmounting political pressure, praise
would have fallen upon the authors of the Pact for their foresight and conviction in sticking by their rule. In his book, A
Guide to Critical Legal Studies,222 Professor Mark Kelman asserts a point that is of particular interest in light of those recent
budgetary promises by members of the EMU. In a section titled, “General Arguments for Rules and for Standards,” Professor Kelman states that if legislatures promulgate rules in order
to promote a certain type of behavior (or to deter another type of
behavior), members of society will eventually conform to the
rule and act in the prescribed manner. In this situation, rules,
as Professor Kelman expresses, are “dynamically stabilizing.”223
Members may initially “toe the line” set by the rule or even vio220. Hofheinz & Rhoads, supra note 99.
221. Juston Jones, France Issues Warning on Growth, WALL ST. J., Sept. 9,
2002, available at 2002 WL-WSJ 3405489.
222. KELMAN, supra note 128.
223. KELMAN, supra note 128, at 44 (“If decision makers are willing to put
up with disquieting results in particular cases, people will gradually learn to
comply with the rules.”). Professor Kelman also reveals that some consider
rules “dynamically destabilizing” when people begin to “walk the line” and
when the rules grow to accommodate exceptions. Id. In these instances, rules
fail to promote a society’s policies, either because they are so clear, or because
they become difficult to interpret. Id.
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late the rule to see how serious the rule will be enforced and
interpreted. In this instance the theory is based on how firmly
the factions interpreting and enforcing the rule stand. Once the
legislature promulgates the rule, even an austere rule, if the
rule is both enforced and interpreted strictly, in time, the members of the society will follow the rule.224 In turn, people will
learn to comply with the rules rather than break the law,225
thereby eventually achieving the policy makers’ intended result.
If the EU stands by the Pact and its Members subsequently
abide by its strict provisions Professor Kelman’s theory will certainly prove to be a formula for success — at least with the Stability and Growth Pact.226
However, the promises that the Members States make and
whether they can perform according to those promises are entirely different. In fact, when Germany made its pronouncement that its deficit was 3.5%, analysts argued that it was improbable that Germany could bounce back from its recent economic downturn and recover enough to ensure that its budget
deficit would remain above 3% GDP for the year.227 Moreover,
on September 25, 2002, the European Commission announced
that it would allow the EU’s 15 Member States until 2006 to
bring their budgets closer to balance.228 The decision came as a
result of the likelihood that France, Germany, Italy, and Portugal will each not meet their budget-deficit commitments as
promised.229
Despite the empty promises of the Member States, their inability to meet the requirements of the Pact clearly shows that
the initial rule lacked the flexibility required for the complexity
of the EU’s goal and the diversity of the EU itself. First, if a
rule-making body finds itself needing to promulgate another
new rule because the initial rule was not sufficient, the situa224. Id.
225. Id.
226. It is unlikely that every country in the EMU will have a balanced
budget despite the recent economic forecasts. However, eight out of the eleven
are sure to have a balanced budget which shows that the provisions are realistic and can be followed. Oyama, Commission to Extend Target, supra note 107.
227. Hofheinz & Rhoads, supra note 99 (“To assume that the economy will
improve enough in the second half to bring the deficit in line is unrealistic.”).
228. James, supra note 72; Oyama, Commission to Extend Target, supra
note 107.
229. Id.
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tion negates any cost benefit and efficiency reasons that the
rule-making body relied upon when it decided what type of directive to promulgate in the first place. Second, the benefits of
predictability, avoidance of political pressure, and the ability to
plan are also curtailed. Although the decision to establish a
new date to achieve a balance budget seemed necessary in order
to help several members of the EMU, it is not difficult to see
why the other Member States who have been able to abide by
their plans to keep their budget deficits below 3% GDP and
meet the initial balanced budget date in 2004 are wondering
why they were working so hard to comply with this agreement.230 Those countries which remain in compliance are understandably upset, which means that not only will the situation lead to questions about the “stability” of the EMU, but it
will cause internal political conflict as well. Still, the main
point to be taken could simply be that the EU should not have
tried to promulgate a strict rule to undertake such a new and
enormous venture.231
2. Imposing Sanctions
Lastly, the fact that the EU imported more flexibility into the
provision of the Stability and Growth Pact dealing with sanctions, shows that it recognized the need to establish a standardlike directive for such an unpredictable situation. Of course,
any possibility of sanctions which a Member State may have to
sustain will prove to be a substantial burden especially to a nation who is hurt economically. However, the flexibility provided
by the 2%–5% range of the sanction provision, can remove some
of the sting caused by the harshness of an inflexible rule.232 As
stated earlier, factors which allow the ECOFIN Counsel to de230. Graff, supra note 66. Finance Ministers from those countries “that
have crimped and clawed to get their budgets in line” were not pleased to put
it politely. Id.
231. Reforming the EU’s Stability Pact?, supra note 121.
The fact is [ ] that there never has been a currency union between
sovereign nations on this scale before, so no one can be certain what
kind of fiscal rules will work best. ‘Learning by doing’ is an excellent
idea in a kindergarten. But it is a slightly alarming was of running
the European economy.
Id.
232. Though it may not be enough flexibility.
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termine the severity of the violation will most likely weigh in
the final decision of how large to make the sanctions. Like a
judge who is sentencing a defendant, the Counsel will undoubtedly consider many factors when applying the punishment. The
standard allows those sanctions to be levied in a measured degree and affords the EU the latitude to deal with the economic
differences between member states. As the provision is a standard-like directive, promulgated to deal with numerous situations, it should prove to be an effective provision of the Pact in
deterring large deficits.
VI. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the main priority of the EU in employing the Stability and Growth Pact is the stability of the euro. As rules are
often necessary to provide government interests their proper
force, the EU may have been correct to utilize rules to seek
their objectives. With the use of standards and more factspecific decisions, the likelihood increases that the decisionmaker would have found (possibly valid) sympathetic reasons
for growing deficits that outweigh the EU’s long-term interests,
thereby creating political pressures. The EU surely considered
these very implications when formulating the rule-like provisions of the Pact. However, the reality is that a diverse group of
nations is trying for the first time to conduct its economic affairs under one currency and one economy after several hundreds of years of acting under separate currencies and economies. Although a rule may have seemed to be the correct solution when considering the desired result, the underlying circumstances in the case of the EMU may not allow for the successful implementation of such a “rule.”
Paul de Grauwe, an economics professor and prior candidate
to join European Central Bank, has long held that “a rigid system of target numbers was a poor way to guide budgetary policy.”233 Some economists have proposed that the EU allow its
members to exceed the 3% deficit when the economic situation
233. Graff, supra note 66. Mr. de Grauwe had been quoted as asking, “Why
should people believe that 3% is some magic number?...No other country has
such a rule.” Id. De Grauwe also sums up the present effect of the Pact in
that although it is a defensive mechanism meant to guard against inflations,
it is a dangerous tool in time of deflation. Id.
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in their countries calls for such measures by the government.234
These economists suggest that the EU focus instead on the
“structural deficit, which is based on spending policies unaffected by economic changes.”235 That way, the ECOFIN Counsel
can judge the Member State based on the prudence of a government’s management of its economy and not on the economic
situation which the government finds itself. Others have proposed raising the deficit limit from 3 to 5% GDP.236 Still others
have gone as far as to say the EU should eliminate the deficit
limit and replace it with a “commitment to keep official borrowing within agreed limits.”237 The answer to whether or not the
EU decides to transform the Pact into a more flexible standardbased law238 lies a few years away, because the EU cannot
amend the Pact until 2005.239 Abandoning the rules now would
only risk international mockery.240
In promulgating the Stability and Growth Pact, the EU may
have given too much weight to the opinion of its international
partners. The concern was that if the Pact was too flexible, the
world would take neither the EMU nor the euro seriously. The
EU may have been looking more outwardly than it should have,
when its initial focus should have been to devise an internal
solution. The EU should not have worried about the world’s
initial opinion of the euro and of the Pact. No other entity coerced the EU into this undertaking. The Member States themselves chose to form the EMU. The EU flourished due to the
success of open trading. However, the EU as a whole knew its
only recourse to remain relevant in the global marketplace was
for its members to turn again to each other in order to form an

234. Hofheinz & Rhoads, supra note 99.
235. Id.
236. Reforming the EU’s Stability Pact?, supra note 121.
237. Hofheinz & Rhoads, supra note 99.
238. Re-engineering the Euro, supra note 74 (“At the very least, the stability
pact should be redefined in terms of the fiscal balance adjusted over the economic cycle. That would give governments more room to respond to a
slump.”).
239. Restoring Europe’s Smile, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 26, 2002, available at
2002 WL 7247929 (“Europe will rub along with the pact and semi-comply ,
destroying many jobs, albeit not as many as strict obedience would destroy.”).
240. Id.
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ever tighter economic relationship.241 In doing so, the members
should have based their goal of establishing a new currency on
that relationship, while recognizing their differences to devise a
standard-based regime which could deal with those differences
while effectively stabilizing the euro. Instead, it seems the EU
was attempting to back itself into a good situation. It was trying to capture the world’s confidence in the EMU and the euro
by promulgating a strict Pact.242 It should have devised a more
workable standard that would have ensured the continued economic stability of the region while the Member States worked
together in order to achieve that stability.243 Such a result
would have undoubtedly captured the world’s confidence.
Still, the root cause behind the strictness of the Pact and the
fear of instability was the ongoing distrust that the members of
the EU have for each other and their inability to lay their differences aside.244 It is ironic that the Pact is, itself, supposed to
be a “political totem.”245 It aims to show the rest of the world
that the nations of the EMU will not cheat on one another.246
The result, however, has lead to what the EU has been trying to
avoid all along — a mockery. This group of nations mutually
and amicably decided to form an economic union to preserve
and promote their own economic future. That some Member
States which fought so hard for a tighter union would not trust
their neighbors (as well as the EU’s own abilities to govern)
enough to allow a standard-based regime to compensate for ob-

241. That relationship thus far has been an economic relationship. However, even the initial motive behind creating an economic relationship and
therefore interdependence in Europe developed shortly after World War II to
prevent war between European nations. Looking towards the future, the limits (or possibilities) for further political unification within the EU lie only in
the present ambitions of each Member States representatives. “A common
foreign policy… is a cherished goal.” Id.
242. Re-engineering the Euro, supra note 74 (“The central charge increasingly made against the euro and all its works is that the institutions and policy instruments agreed upon in Maastricht a decade ago were all intended to
bear down upon an inflationary threat that no longer exists.”).
243. Though the use of standards would generally lead to some degree of
uncertainty, this does not necessarily mean that a lack of stability will inevitably follow.
244. Reforming the EU’s Stability Pact?, supra note 121.
245. Id.
246. Id.
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vious and unavoidable economic differences is itself a puzzling
notion.
In short, in devising the Stability and Growth Pact, the EU
should have relied on its own ability to perform as a “Union”
instead of promulgating a rule in order to force its members to
conform with the requirements of the EMU. The differences
between the Member States, which comprise the EMU, make it
difficult to devise one rule that will suit eleven or more nations.
Of course the rules and standards debate will lead a legal theorist (and maybe an economic strategist) down many paths that
will arguably provide a similar number of pros and cons for
each side. Furthermore, competing theories discussing the
rules and standards debate, from the standpoint of costs to the
standpoint of deterrence, lead to varying results. However, the
fact remains that when considering the advantages and disadvantages of using rules or standards, the EU should do so while
remembering that it has the luxury of the ongoing relationships
which its members have built with each other over many
years247 as well as mutual reliance (which each state has chosen
to promote) on each other’s economies. In promulgating internal directives for the members of the EMU, these nations may
want to consider the use of a more flexible standard,248 and the
reliance on their long–term relationships, before they turn to
more rigid rules. That way, not only will the EU win the confidence of the world in its endeavors such as the establishment of
the euro, but it will also command the world’s admiration in its
ability to work together.
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247. Restoring Europe’s Smile, supra note 239 (“Politics will still be messy,
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